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Abstract 
There is a need to find better models and indicators for large disruptive events, not least in 
order to be more prepared and mitigate their effects. In this paper we take a step in this 
direction and discuss the performance of a financial stress indicator with a specific focus on 
the euro area. As far as we know, our indicator is the first attempt to develop an indicator of 
financial stress with a specific focus on the euro area. It is also the first to exploit the 
information contained in central bank communication to help measure stress in financial 
markets. For use in real time, the indicator is able to efficiently extract information from an 
otherwise noisy signal and provide information about the level of stress in the markets.  
 
JEL codes: E44, E50, G10 
Key words: Financial stress, central bank communication, logit distribution, leading indicator, 
behavioural finance. 5
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Non-technical summary 
There is a need to find better models and indicators for large disruptive events, not least in 
order to be more prepared and mitigate their effects. In this paper we take a step in this 
direction by constructing a financial stress indicator. As far as we know, our indicator is the 
first attempt to develop an indicator of financial stress with a specific focus on the euro area. 
It is also the first to exploit the information contained in central bank communication to help 
measure the level of stress in financial markets. 
It is important to note that financial stress is related to – but is not identical – to 
market volatility. For example, there can be a lot of volatility in the market when new 
unexpected information arrives in a flow but this need not imply that there is stress in the 
market. On the opposite end, with high financial spreads signifying something amiss, for 
example that no trade is taking place, the volatility might be very low but stress very high. 
The Financial Stress Indicator presented in this paper uses statistical techniques and 
judgement to pin down an indicator that is much richer in nuance than simple measures of 
volatility. In fact, some volatility based measures (such as the VSTOXX) even failed to pick 
up the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis is the largest and most significant time of financial 
stress in modern times, but even if its magnitude exceeds others it is not the only one. Both 
empirical research and anecdotal evidence suggest that rare events with potentially large 
impact play a more important role than often accorded to them by the financial literature. 
Other prominent examples are the dot.com bust, Y2K, the accounting irregularities associated 
with some firms such as Arthur Anderssen, Enron, and Worldcom as well as the Russian 
sovereign debt default in 1998. The events have different causes and effects, but share the trait 
of being, by and large, surprises that caused considerably disruptions to the markets. In recent 
popular and academic works, rare events of this calibre have been labelled “Black-Swans”, 
denoting a disruptive event that seems “so unlikely that it only seems possible after it has 
occurred”, see Taleb (2007) and Taylor and Williams (2008). But also large events but 
somewhat less extreme are of interest if they cause disruptions in the markets. 
We know now, and have indeed known for some time, that these events occur too 
often and are too disruptive to be explained fully by mainstream financial models, especially 
those that espouse normally distributed shocks in the system. One calculation by 
Mandelbrot (2008) estimates that in classical models a shock, such as the recent one, should 6
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occur only one time in a billion years. Clearly, having at least two such events within a 
century shows that the risks of rare and disruptive events and their effects are underestimated 
in mainstream models of finance. 
In this paper we do not take a stance on the theoretical challenges posed by rare 
disruptive events. We note that there are different research agendas that recognise the 
challenges to standard models, such as models from behavioural finance as well as attempts to 
build in frictions and imperfections into neo-classical models. For our purposes it is enough to 
note that rare events are overrepresented in the data and that is desirable to measure them 
better with a view of being able to detect changes in the level of financial stress earlier, and, 
hopefully, be able to do something to alleviate the effects.  
The methodology in this paper is simple. We use quantitative methods to extract 
information about the level of stress from an otherwise set of noisy financial markets data. We 
use the information from the published ECB Monthly Bulletins to identify periods of stress 
(as measured by the number of times that certain a priori specified key words occur). The 
Monthly Bulletins have several advantages in this regard. They capture movements in the 
economy, are widely distributed and read and do not reflect any vested or commercial 
interests.  
The signal extracted is from key financial markets data available on high frequency. 
This means the indicator can be used in real time to extract information about the level of 
stress in the markets. We show that the indicator has a good performance in detecting the 
build-up of disruptive events while producing few false positives. While a full-scale rolling-
regression type evaluation is not performed, a more simple out-of-sample evaluation shows 
that the results are robust. 
How should the results be interpreted? An increased signal of stress from the 
indicator is an argument in favour of applying more judgement to standard forecasting tools 
and for taking extra care to monitor financial markets developments. In particular, linear 
econometric models may not be the most appropriate tools when “rare events” are affecting 
the markets.  7
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we take a quantitative approach to investigate financial stress and construct an 
indicator for the euro area, improving on the indicator proposed by Nelson and Perli (2006) 
for the US. In particular, we use a larger and more informative dataset of individual variables 
and gauge performance both by estimating the indicator out-of-sample as well as using the 
indicator as a measuring rod against other well known measures of economic conditions. 
The challenge for a financial stress indicator (hereafter FSI) is, on the one hand, to be 
able to accurately and timely signal times of stress while, on the other, to not have “too many” 
false positives and “cry wolf”. The disruptive events pose special econometric challenges as 
they occur seldom but have big impact. In other words, there are few but important data 
points on which to base inference. In some econometric work it may be appropriate to treat 
such events as outliers, for example by using dummy variables, but arguably this poses 
questions about how useful such estimates are in times of turmoil. In particular, linear 
econometric models may be less informative the further out in the tails of the distribution 
events occur. Simple linear regressions may be misleading when drawing inferences about 
rare events as abundant empirical research has shown that the tails of distributions are often 
thicker than had they been drawn from a normal or symmetric distribution. 
Aside from difficulties in estimation and interpretation, probabilities of large bad 
events had a bit of an uphill struggle before the 2007-2009 financial crisis when the “mood” 
was less open to suggestions that good times may not last, not least witnessed by the work 
under the rubric of “irrational exuberance” in notable contributions prior to the financial crisis 
by Shiller (2000) and also expressed in several speeches by Alan Greenspan when he was 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The 2007-2009 financial crisis has shown in no uncertain 
terms that rare events occur more often than classical models based on normality would 
indicate. Moreover, events, such as LTCM, the dot.com crash and 9/11 highlight that 
disruptive events are, unfortunately, not as rare as we would like. More importantly, our 
ability to detect them in real time, or preferably before they occur, leaves much to be desired. 
Here we develop an indicator that distinguishes between tranquil periods and acute 
periods of stress. It can be used to: 
1) assess the current state of the financial markets in the euro area in a timely way, and, 
therefore, it provides a timely snapshot of contemporaneous stress in the financial 8
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markets; 
2) relate its signal to other information obtained from models and other sources. 
The use of the FSI as a complement to other information is explored more fully below, but the 
information content to assess the real time sentiment in the market is a use in its own right. It 
is well known from assessing business cycles that the current state of the economy, for 
example as measured by output gaps, is measured with considerable uncertainty. This also 
holds true for measuring asset price bubbles. In the same vein, the FSI can convey 
information about the current state of the markets, allowing gauging the severity of financial 
events as they transpire and yet summarising a lot of information in a single, simple-to-use 
indicator. 
While formal models that allow for extreme events (or 10-sigma events as expressed 
by Nobel Prize winner M. Scholes when LTCM collapsed) exist, they are not necessarily easy 
to take to the data or to apply. The FSI, on the other hand, does not rest firmly on an 
optimising model from mathematical finance but is relatively straightforward to use. This 
makes it important to investigate the performance of the FSI in a variety of dimensions, and 
this is reflected in the organisation of the paper. Section 2 describes the rationale for the FSI 
and how we construct it by aggregating market-based variables and extracting information 
from the ECB Monthly Bulletins. Section 3 discusses how to compute the FSI, and how it 
compares to other known indices such as the VSTOXX as well as robustness properties. 
Section 4 deals with the use of the FSI as a forward indicator. Although it is not designed for 
this purpose, it turns out to have some good properties in this regard. The last section 
concludes.  
2.  Constructing the Financial Stress Indicator (FSI) 
2.1  On defining stress 
The financial literature does not provide a precise definition of financial stress but, in general, 
stress is the product of vulnerable markets and of shocks that can be either exogenous or, 
more likely, endogenous. For the purposes of this paper, we can think of the level of stress as 
being determined by the interaction between financial vulnerabilities and the size of shocks. 
The more fragile financial conditions are, i.e. the more vulnerable markets are, the more likely 
a shock is to result in stress. In extreme cases, either when the shock is very large or when 
financial conditions are very weak, a shock can result in a crisis and extreme stress.  9
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We derive a measure of financial stress in the form of an indicator (FSI). Therefore 
our approach is related to the literature on financial (currency and banking) crises and to the 
literature on early warning signals. However, compared to the majority of studies in these 
areas, the FSI has several attractive features. First, it is based on real time-high frequency 
data. Second, it takes a broader perspective as the aim is the assessment of the level of stress 
of the overall financial system at any point in time. Third, it belongs to a very small group of 
indicators constructed for developed economies. Related papers are Illing and Liu (2006) who 
develop a financial stress index for the Canadian economy, Nelson and Perli (2006) who 
construct one for U.S. economy and more recently Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall (2009) who 
analyse the experience from episodes of financial stress and economic cycles among 17 
advanced economies over the past three decades. 
There are also few measures of stress or, more generally, of market conditions 
provided by market data providers and private research institutions. For example Bloomberg 
has its own financial conditions index which is based on yield spreads and measures of 
money, bond and stock markets. The OECD publishes a composite leading indicator of 
economic activity for the OECD countries while the CEPR has computed a real time indicator 
of expansion and contraction of the economic cycle, called the €coin.
1 Both the CEPR and 
OECD indices may be related to changes in financial conditions. As far as we know, the FSI 
is the first attempt to develop an indicator of financial stress with a specific focus on the euro 
area. 
It is also the first indicator to exploit the information contained in central bank 
communication to help measure the level of stress in financial markets. While becoming 
increasingly richer, the literature on central bank communication has remained focus on either 
predicting future asset prices (for example, see Lucca and Trebbi (2009)) or on addressing 
transparency issues (see, for example, Bligh and Hess (2009)). 
We use a three steps procedure to compute the FSI. First, we select a list of 
“stressful” events, then we construct a measure of stress, finally we connect the previous two 
by using a logit model. 
                                                 
1 The €coin is computed by CEPR as contingent indicator of economic conditions. It has a monthly frequency. 
See www.cepr.com for details.  10
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2.2  Constructing a list of stressful events 
Because of the lack of an agreed upon definition of financial stress, it is not entirely 
unproblematic to identify financial stress periods. In addition, dating financial stress periods is 
also not straightforward as the literature provides several methods to date financial crises but 
not stress. One method of dating is provided in Illing and Liu (2006). Another approach is 
provided in Bussière and Fratzscher (2006), who also take into account post-crisis periods, so 
that the crisis variable takes value of zero in tranquil periods, one before and during the crisis, 
and two in the post-crisis period. Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper (2003) distinguish between 
currency crisis, banking crisis and debt crisis. For currency crises, they use a variety of 
determinants, while they identify banking and debt crisis with the help of IMF reports and 
central banks publications. Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) use a qualitative 
approach to identify banking crises which focuses on events, for example the occurrence of 
bank runs. To identify events they rely on existing studies of banking crises and on historical 
narratives.  
Since there is no commonly agreed list of stressful events in the euro area, one way 
to proceed is to create a list that matches well-defined criteria. We draw from the existing 
literature by combining information in a qualitative-quantitative approach, inspired by studies 
in other fields such as linguistic and fine arts that blend informal methods with quantitative 
ones.  
Our method is as follows. First, we use judgement to identify periods of stress 
around episodes of financial tensions, for example Y2K, the dot.com bubble, the Worldcom 
accounting irregularity and the recent global financial crisis (see table 1). The selected 
episodes are events that have received considerable exposure in the financial press and in the 
markets.
2 While there is some element of subjectivity involved, the episodes correspond 
closely to events discussed in other papers and would be classified as periods of stress under a 
wide range of classification schemes.
3 In order to be able to pin down as precisely as possible 
the starting and the ending periods, we draw on selected financial press as well as the ECB 
Monthly Bulletins and in particular on the editorial and the sections that are dedicated to 
                                                 
2 See, for example, The Economist 15
th July 2002, 28
th Nov 2002, 3
rd June 2004 and 21
st October 2004. See also 
appendix 1.  
3  See, for example, Chulia, Climent, Soriano and Torro (2009). 11
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financial markets.
4 In so doing, we extract information related to the direction of markets, the 
overall economy as well as the “mood” of the markets.  
Table 1. Periods of stress 
Y2K Jul 99 - Jan 00
dot.com Mar 00 - Dec 00
 9/11 Sep 01 - Nov 01
Corporate scandals Jun 02 - Aug 02
Iraq war Mar 03 - May 03
Madrid bombings March 04
Heightened uncertainty/Oil prices increases Jun 04 - Dec 04
London bombings July 05
Global financial crisis  Aug 07 - Jun 09
 
In table 1 we show periods of heightened uncertainty and tensions. Although the periods are 
carefully chosen, there is an inevitable element of subjectiveness in the selection that we try to 
keep as well-defined and limited as possible. Subjective is not the same as arbitrary, however, 
and we will see further below the advantages of this approach. In addition, we run a “word 
search” over the whole text in each ECB’s Monthly Bulletin in order to systematically 
identify nuances in communication.
5 
What is the value added of using the Monthly Bulletins in this way? Do they not 
already contain an assessment that reflects the financial and real economy? What is the point 
of extracting something that is already using measured language and from a source that does 
not have any vested commercial interests? If we were interested in estimating parameters in a 
model, there could potentially be an identification issue as both financial markets and the 
ECB’s assessment in some ways reflect what we are aiming to measure. But Lucca and 
                                                 
4 Extracting information from Monthly Bulletins has also been done by Gerlach (2004) and Rosa and 
Verga(2005).  
5 Ideally we would have liked to run a “word search” also on text from other sources but the level of noise has 
proved to be too high for a meaningful exercise. 12
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Trebbi (2009) and Bligh and Hess (2009) show that the flow of information from central 
banks is relevant for the movements and for the volatility of financial markets.
6 In addition, 
Rosa and Verga (2005) have shown that the Monthly Bulletins contain complementary 
information to that of the markets that has a value in its own right.
7 Moreover, we are not 
interested in identification of parameters per se; we are interested in extracting information on 
financial stress that has good signal-to-noise properties. Thus, ultimately the performance of 
the FSI should be measured on how well it extracts information and how much it helps us to 
clarify the often conflicting signals from different sources. 
The Monthly Bulletins have another advantage as well. It is true that some other 
sources can provide information at higher frequency, such as weekly or daily data. 
Unfortunately, the higher the frequency the stronger the noise in the signal tends to be. And 
even when noise can be efficiently filtered away, filters contain their own set of problems.  
Overall, monthly frequency provides a good balance between the need for timely information 
and the potential risk of overreacting to noise. 
The word-search in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins was conducted as follows. We 
searched for words whose meaning is commonly associated with stress, tensions, 
vulnerabilities or general weakness in the financial markets as well as in the overall economy. 
In order to avoid tilting the results, we also include several words with positive meaning, such 
as “recovery”, “robust” and “favourable”. Appendix 1 shows the complete list of selected 
positive and  negative words.
8 Notwithstanding that the choice of words is somewhat 
subjective and it is difficult to have clear-cut words of positive (no-stress) or negative (stress) 
meaning, the chosen words are selected with the intent to minimise possible misinterpretation. 
For example, the noun risk, depending on the context, could have a positive nuance if risks 
were lower or negative if risk were higher. Nonetheless, when the word risk appears it means 
that there are risks and therefore there is (at least some) stress in the economy. There may 
                                                 
6 In particular, Lucca and Trebbi (2009) attempt to measure central bank communication about future interest 
rate decisions based on information from the Internet and news sources while trying to control for “semantic 
orientation”, i.e. the intensity and the direction of meaning. They apply the methodology to the statements 
released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) after its policy meetings. Bligh and Hess (2009) 
try to establish the impact of Greenspan’s speeches, testimonies and FOMC statements on financial market 
variables by applying computerised content analysis.    
7 Although the FSI-word search extracts information from ECB-publications, it should not be interpreted as an 
indicator of ECB communication. 
8 We ran a pre-selection on a larger pool of words in order to pin down a workable number of words. We require 
that the selected words appear at least once in the Monthly Bulletins for each year, with the exception of the 
word crisis. In addition, in case of synonyms we choose the word that appears more often.  13
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remain cases in which the semantic orientation of the sentence may partially bias the results of 
the word-search.
9 But, in general terms, semantic orientation issues, as also highlighted by the 
analysis of Lucca and Trebbi (2009), are more relevant for the public dialogue than for the 
written language of a central bank. 
To illustrate the results of the word-search for the year 2007, when the global 
financial crisis started, see table 2. The complete results for all years are shown in appendix 2. 
To capture variations of the chosen words, we use a wildcard in the search algorithm, which 
in table 2 is denoted by a “*”. To set a benchmark for the stress signal, we first count the 
number of negative (positive) words for each month, then we compute the average number of 
negative (positive) words. In order to avoid distortions due to the different lengths of the 
Monthly Bulletins, the average of negative (positive) words is weighted by the number of 
pages.
10 Third, we specify a threshold such that when the weighted average of negative 
(positive) words is above such a threshold it signals a period of high (low) stress and when 
below the threshold it signals low stress (high stress). We choose the threshold as the average 
over the all year of the sum of negative (positive) words. 
In order to decide in which months the signal from the Monthly Bulletins is positive 
(no-stress) or negative (stress), we look at the weighted average of each month, as reported at 
the bottom of the table. If the monthly average for negative (positive) words is larger than the 
threshold negative (positive) in table 2 then the signal is negative. This will translate in a 
binary variable to take value 1 (0). There will be cases in which the signal is not clear-cut, as, 
for example, the month of April 2007 in table 2. In particular, there will be cases in which 
both positive and negative signals are detected and cases where neither appear. In those cases 
we apply the following simple rule: if the monthly “average negative” minus one is larger 
than the monthly “average positive” then the signal will be coded as negative (i.e., one). In 
addition, we also look at the previous and subsequent period, as good and bad periods tend to 
cluster, the direction of the signal is usually confirmed by the signal of closest periods. 
                                                 
9 Some sentences would be especially problematic, such as: “The enormous risks hitherto present in the economy 
have now completely disappeared and everything is fine.” Luckily for our purposes, such phrases are unusual 
in the ECB Monthly Bulletins. 
10 Monthly Bulletins have become progressively lengthier. Results are robust also to other threshold measures, 
such as the simple sum (divided by the number of pages).  14
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Applying these rules is mostly but not completely straightforward; in the few ambiguous 
cases, we have applied judgment, also based on information from other sources.
11   
Table 2. Word-search: list of words and results for the year 2007 
jan-07 feb-07 mar-07 apr-07 maj-07 jun-07 jul-07 aug-07 sep-07 okt-07 nov-07 dec-07
slow* 9 19 29 22 25 16 33 21 29 36 34 28
uncertain* 20 36 26 41 25 21 31 19 41 26 46 44
weak* 30 14 11 10 12 8 10 16 11 26 13 26
 decelerat* 4 7 2 6 3 5 8 5 5 9 7 1
 adverse* 2 3 2 2 0 0 8 8 4 1 11 5
 risk* 54 83 76 105 108 86 96 149 97 114 144 105
 deteriorat* 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 7 6
 difficult* 0 3 5 2 2 0 2 0 5 21 21 7
 vigilant 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
 tension* 4 0 0 3 0 4 4 6 21 43 36 45
imbalance* 11 10 9 8 13 9 10 13 8 9 10 19
 downturn 0 0 2 2 0 3 2 0 1 1 2 2
 contract* 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 2
 stabilis* 9 5 8 2 5 6 10 10 7 4 7 6
 improve* 14 17 28 14 8 12 23 16 5 4 3 11
 eas* 7 22 8 2 28 5 2 30 8 24 5 11
 expan* 30 15 19 10 22 18 31 21 14 13 23 25
sound 4 2 5 2 3 1 2 3 4 3 8 19
 robust 55 54 40 48 48 44 42 35 22 26 26 28
 favourable 23 25 46 33 28 43 33 35 33 17 20 21
 recover* 11 2 4 0 0 2 2 8 4 0 2 2
 upturn 4 0 0 5 2 2 6 3 0 1 0 0
 turmoil 0 0 8 11 0 8 4 17 20 13 51 39
 crisis 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4
optimis* 2 2 4 0 3 2 6 3 0 1 2 1
 pessimis* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
average negative 2007 10 13 13 16 13 11 15 18 18 22 28 24
average positive 2007 16 14 16 12 15 14 16 17 10 10 10 12
threshold negative 17
threshold positive 13  
 
As can be seen from table 2, tensions were clearly higher in the markets from the summer 
2007 till the end of the year. These are also the months where the average number of times the 
words of negative meaning are above the threshold whereas the words of positive meaning are 
below. For example, the words uncertainty and adverse tend to appear relatively often in the 
third and fourth quarter of 2007 and reach record high in November. Symmetrically, the 
words of positive meaning robust and favourable, reach the lowest levels in September and 
October.  
Table 3 shows the results of the word search for the year 2000, i.e. the year when the 
dot.com bubble busted. As it appears in the table, the months from March to June are the 
                                                 
11 Almost all data (or 90% of the observations) can be categorised in this automated way. For those observations 
that cannot, we have applied judgement based on information from other sources (see Appendix 2). Our 
preferred sources of information are The Economist and the Financial Times. This is not only for the high 
quality of such sources in terms of analysis and description of events but also because they are at a frequency 
that is suitable for our purposes.   15
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months where the frequency of negative words is higher. However, also the positive words 
score high and are above the threshold level for March and April and just equal to the 
threshold for the month of May. 
Table 3. Word-search: list of words and results for the year 2000 
jan-00 feb-00 mar-00 apr-00 maj-00 jun-00 jul-00 aug-00 sep-00 okt-00 nov-00 dec-00
slow* 57 25 29 66 18 42 24 25 41 4 43 98
uncertain* 16 3 53 22 25 31 0 17 16 18 16 43
weak* 14 20 13 24 14 8 11 14 14 11 9 17
 decelerat* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
 adverse* 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 7 2 9
 risk* 30 18 40 24 41 63 18 22 30 16 14 28
 deteriorat* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 difficult* 0 0 3 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 2 1
 vigilant 3 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 tension* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
imbalance* 0 0 2 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 2 5
 downturn 3 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 contract* 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 1
 stabilis* 0 3 2 2 0 3 5 3 6 11 2 5
 improve* 14 8 11 15 9 12 24 14 12 4 9 4
 eas* 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
 expan* 16 23 10 17 7 24 3 14 10 4 7 21
sound 0 0 2 0 0 5 5 0 0 2 2 1
 robust 8 15 3 5 9 12 5 14 13 11 5 10
 favourable 0 15 10 12 0 10 5 14 26 7 11 11
 recover* 32 20 16 12 2 20 11 17 14 0 2 7
 upturn 16 5 6 0 7 3 5 0 4 2 0 0
 turmoil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 crisis 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0
optimis* 11 3 11 0 0 3 5 0 6 2 0 0
 pessimis* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
average negative 2000 12 7 15 14 11 16 5 8 10 6 10 20
average positive 2000 10 9 7 7 3 9 7 8 9 4 4 6
threshold negative 11
threshold positive 7  
These results are not surprising and are consistent with anecdotal evidence. Notably, the 
effects from the sharp decline in the NASDAQ composite index from its peak in March were 
beginning to be more widely felt on the European markets only from mid-spring. In fact, 
despite the sharp decline in the NASDAQ, the mood on the European markets remained fairly 
positive. For example, The Economist (2000a) referring to the dot.com focuses on the M&As 
activities of several European stock exchanges. The editorial of the March Monthly Bulletin 
in 2000 (last paragraph on page 6) reports that: 
“In conclusion, economic conditions and prospects for the euro area appear to be 
better at present than at any time in the past decade. Growth is strong, 
employment is expected to increase further and the still high level of 
unemployment should continue to fall. Remaining vigilant to counter upside risks 
to price stability and pursuing structural reform are the foundation for a sustained 
period of strong economic expansion and a lasting process of job creation.” 
 
In April after stating that there were risks to price stability, the editorial of the Monthly 
Bulletin (page 5) reports that: 16
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“...both consumer and industrial confidence have now reached levels which are at 
or close to the highest since the start of these series in the mid-1980s. This picture 
of continuing strong domestic demand supports the favourable outlook for 
economic growth in the euro area as shown in recent forecasts.” 
But even after the Black Friday (14th April) when the NASDAQ had lost 34% compared only 
to one month earlier, in accounts from the financial press …”most bulls remained …bullish” 
(The Economist (2000b)) – even though market uncertainty was increasing with great speed.  
Such patterns are also shown in the Chart 1 where in panel (a) are shown the words 
risk and uncertainty and in panel (b) the words robust and favourable. Chart 2 instead shows 
the weighted averages of negative and positive words for all the words in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Chart 1. Selected words frequency, year 2000 and 2007 
                              Year 2007                                                        Year 2000 
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Chart 2. Average of negative and positive words, year 2007 and 2000 



























































































































































It is now uncontroversial that the crisis 2007-2009 was the most severe crisis in decades. 
Moreover, it was for the most part unexpected. Strikingly, this appears also from Chart 2 
where on the left panel the average of positive and negative words for 2007 is represented. 
While the average for negative words was increasing since June 2007, the average of positive 
words sharply drops from September 2007 till the end of that year. It is also noteworthy that 
for the dot.com bubble, on the right panel of Chart 2, the average of negative words increases 
around the months of the bust and, correspondingly, that of the positive words declines but the 
overall picture is less clear-cut than in 2007.  
To capture the information in our full sample, we repeated the word-search for each 
month of each year between July 1999 and October 2009. The results of this search are 
displayed in Table 4, where each word’s appearance is simply aggregated over the respective 18
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year. As threshold value, we choose the average number of appearances for each word. At the 
bottom of the table, the last two rows show the average of the number of negative (stress) and 
positive (no-stress) words over the whole year. In Chart 3, we plot these two rows. Clearly, 
there are years in which stress was high and years (between 2004 and 2007) where it was low. 
As per construction, these years coincide with the years in which the average number of 
negative (positive) words as they appear in table 4 is above the threshold. Notably, for the 
years (2000-2003) when the average number of negative (positive) words is not above the 
threshold, the signal that there was stress in financial market is arguably weaker than at other 
points, notably in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
12  
 
Table 4. Word-search results, 1999 -2009 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
slow* 50 39 75 35 17 23 36 29 25 62 40
uncertain* 27 22 41 52 59 58 40 32 31 35 49
weak* 16 14 36 30 38 21 33 18 15 49 53
 decelerat* 5 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 5 5 13
 adverse* 2 2 4 7 6 3 3 1 4 7 8
 risk* 33 29 37 29 38 54 73 91 102 98 56
 deteriorat* 0 0 6 2 2 2 2 1 2 9 11
 difficult* 1 1 5 10 8 3 3 2 6 0 0
 vigilant 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 tension* 5 0 1 3 10 1 0 6 14 41 13
imbalance* 1 1 4 8 7 9 7 12 11 8 4
 downturn 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 16
 contract* 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 5 26
 stabilis* 6 4 6 8 12 9 4 3 7 10 16
 improve* 19 11 3 9 13 21 20 18 13 5 9
 eas* 0 1 2 1 2 6 13 14 13 6 6
 expan* 9 13 5 6 5 12 8 14 20 15 8
sound 0 1 3 4 3 5 4 5 5 8 3
 robust 5 9 6 3 4 21 30 38 39 19 5
 favourable 8 10 10 7 8 17 21 28 30 11 2
 recover* 18 13 8 25 19 35 10 9 3 3 9
 upturn 6 4 1 4 3 3 1 1 2 0 1
 turmoil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 34 21
 crisis 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 4 12
optimis* 0 3 1 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 0
 pessimis* 4 0 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
average negative 14 10 16 13 15 14 16 15 17 28 25
average positive 10 7 5 7 7 13 11 13 13 8 6
threshold negative 17
threshold positive 9  
 
                                                 
12 The year 1999 entries are based on monthly data from July to December. The year 2009 entries are based on 
monthly data from January to October. 19
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When comparing the results of the word-search with those based on the reading of the 
editorial and few selected sections of the Monthly Bulletins as well as of the financial press 
some differences emerge, as shown in Chart 4. However, given the different nature of the 
selection approaches and their different degree of subjectivity we would not expect the 
periods to overlap perfectly. For our purposes it suffices that periods so identified are in line 
with those identified with the more subjective approach based on the reading of the Monthly 
Bulletins and of selected financial press.  



















































MB TABLE 1  
In Chart 4 we see that, while most of the periods of stress overlap, some periods are not 
signalled as stress according to the word-search, for example the period of the London 20
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bombings which caused disruptions and spread panic in July 2005 and the spring and summer 
of 2004 when oil prices spiked in the aftermath of the Iraq war and increasing geopolitical 
tensions. In section 3.4.2 we will look in details what these differences imply for the FSI.  
2.3  Selecting individual indicators 
In the previous section we have discussed the identification and dating of financial stress 
periods. In this section we describe the selection of the underlying variables which are at the 
core of our FSI.  
We select 16 market-based individual variables as basic financial measures. In order 
to have data without too much noise, we choose only data that are of high quality, available at 
daily frequency, have economic relevance and are able to reflect agents’ behaviour. Although 
this is somewhat restrictive and some information might be omitted, the underlying variables 
together cover a relatively broad spectrum of issues related to financial stress. Specifically, 
the variables reflect vulnerabilities in the corporate bond, government bond, banking, equity 
and money markets. We also included several measures that are commonly thought of as 
being a gauge of financial markets mood and to be a fairly reliable measure of agents’ risk 
attitudes, such as the implied stock volatility. Vulnerability in the household sector is 
implicitly reflected in the behaviour of agents in these other markets. Table 5 below lists the 
variables grouped by market segment. 
The choice of the variables reflects to some extent the choice of variables in related 
studies, including Kaminsky (1998) and Illing and Liu (2006). The corporate bond yield 
spreads are used as measures of stress for the corporate sector, see Illing and Liu (2006). They 
are computed as the difference in yield between the corporate bond and government bond 
indices with equivalent maturity. They can widen if expectations of future losses increase 
and/or uncertainty about their magnitude increases. In our sample we use corporate spreads 
related to three different rating classes, i.e. AA, BBB and High Yield. 
For the sovereign bond markets we use the spreads between euro area countries long 
term bonds (10 years) vis-à-vis Germany long term (10 years) bond.
13 In the literature, 
sovereign spreads are often related to fundamentals i.e. liquidity and credit risk premiums, as 
well as to market uncertainty. While liquidity and country creditworthiness usually play a 
                                                 
13 The long term German bond, Bund, is commonly used as the benchmark , as it features both low liquidity and 
credit risk premiums. 21
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role, market uncertainty is commonly found to play a non trivial role, especially at times of 
stress when market uncertainty increases.
14  
For the banking sector, we use bank share prices to proxy for banking market stress. 
Similarly to the literature on stock market bubbles, an increase in bank share prices may be 
indicative of building-up of imbalances (bubble) and therefore might be interpreted as a signal 
of impending stress, while a sudden and protracted decrease in bank share prices (crash) is 
interpreted as a sign of stress. In addition, euro area major banks and financial institutions, 
which represent most of the financial institutions assets, fall in AA and A+ rating class. 
Therefore AA corporate bond spreads can be interpreted as a proxy of banking sector risk 
spread.  
For the equity markets we use share prices, actual earnings per share and equity risk 
premium to proxy for stress. High equity risk premiums are (often) indicative of stress. A 
decline in earnings per share (EPS) may signify trouble and is often interpreted as a sign of 
stress.  
We use the spreads between the Euribor and EONIA rates at different maturities as 
measures of liquidity-premium which may contain information about stress in the money 
markets. In addition, we include the spread between the main refinancing rate and the 2 year 
bond yield. This spreads is indicative of monetary liquidity with a downtrend suggesting a 
worsening of liquidity.  
Finally, we use several measures of risk aversion like the implied stock volatility, 
which is computed through option prices and therefore contains information about 
expectations. We also include in our dataset several measures of uncertainty about the future 
level of interest rates, which may also reflect expectations about future monetary policy. An 
increase in such measures is interpreted as a sign of stress.  
                                                 
14 In tranquil times, assuming that there are not (large) deviations from CIP, market uncertainty explains any 
statistically significant divergence in spreads. 22
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2.4  Aggregating information from the underlying variables 
Following Nelson and Perli (2006), the information contained in these basic individual 
measures is summarised into two summary indices that capture their level and rate-of-change 
(Chart 5). Together these indices contain much of what characterises periods of stress that 
each one on their own might not detect.
15 
The first index, the level index, is a simple arithmetic average of the values of the 
individual variables, rescaled so that 1999=100. The individual variables have been weighted 
by the inverse of their variances so that higher values of the index are associated with greater 
market stress. Chart 5 shows that from the relatively tranquil period from 2004 to the spring 
of 2007, the index dramatically increases from July 2007 onwards, reflecting the strains 
caused by the financial crisis 2007-2009.  
                                                 
15 Nelson and Perli (2006) include also a co-movement variable derived as the first component from a principal 
component analysis. We also included a similar variable but it was not significant and therefore we decided 
to drop it from the analysis.  
Table 5. List of financial variables, weekly data from 1999 to October 2009 
 
•  AA risk spreads  
•  BBB risk spreads 
•  High-yield risk spread 
 
•  Equity risk premium 
•   DJEuroSTOXX 
•  Actual earnings per share (EPS) 
 
•  Sovereign bond spreads 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
versus Germany). 
 
•  1m Euribor-EONIA spread 
•  3m Euribor-EONIA spread 
•  Main refinancing rate – 2yr bond yield 
•  DJ EUROSTOXX Financial  •  Long implied bond volatility 
•  Implied stock volatility  
•  Euribor futures implied volatility  
•  1year forward 1 year swaption implied 
volatility (euro vs Euribor). 
•  1 year forward 10 year swaption 
implied volatility (euro vs Euribor). 
 23
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The  speed with which the underlying market variables change may also give valuable 
information. For example, one would expect that when liquidity premiums, risk spreads and 
measures of uncertainty move higher, markets are becoming more vulnerable and stress is 
building up. Conversely when they move down rapidly, this might indicate that the period of 
(most) acute stress may be passed even if the index remains at elevated levels. 
In order to capture this feature, we construct the second index, the rate-of-change. 
The right-hand panel of Chart 5 shows the rate-of-change of the level index computed over a 
rolling window (over 12 weeks).
16  
2.5  Combining the underlying variables into a single indicator  
In the third step, the information contained in the two indices is combined into a single 
financial stress indicator obtained by using a logit-model to extract the information contained 
in the indices in an efficient way. Specifically, the index is constructed by including the two 
indices on the right-hand side and a binary variable (i.e., St=0 or 1) on the left-hand side of the 
regression. The binary variables St identifies periods of financial stress, as we have identified 
in section 2.2:
17  
            St+h     =  L( β0 + β1λt + β2δt)       h>= 0                                 (1) 
where λ is the level index, δ the rate-of-change, βi (i= 1, 2) are the coefficients and L denotes 
the Logit probability distribution function. The model is estimated using weekly data from 
July 1999 to October 2009. The fitted probability from the estimation of equation 1 is the FSI. 
                                                 
16 The length of the window is chosen as it has the highest R-squared in the logit model presented in section 2.5. 
See also appendix 3. 
17 We do not take explicitly into account dependence in the dependent variable. We use a robust HAC covariance 
matrix when we estimate the model (see Berg and Coke (2004)).  24
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Depending on the value of h, FSI is a contingent indicator (h=0) or a forward indicator (h>0). 
In the following section, we look at the FSI as a contingent indicator. In section 4, we will 
investigate the FSI properties as a forward (leading) indicator. 
3.  The FSI: a contingent indicator 
When estimated with h=0 the model in equation 1 is a model of a contingent indicator, i.e.  
St     = L( β0 + β1λt + β2δt)                                      (2) 
and therefore the FSI gives information about vulnerabilities and stress in the economy and 
their magnitude as they transpire. 
3.1  Insights from behavioural finance 
One criticisms of contingent stress indicators concerns how much value-added they provide 
over and above the data they draw on. While this contains an element of truth, such criticism 
is largely misplaced. In an environment where information is complex, interpreting the signals 
from a variety of sources is a challenge in its own right. The human brain has a limited 
capacity to acquire, process and use complex information. Because of such complexity and 
the limited capacity of the human brain, managing and using information is affected by 
behavioural aspects, and cognitive biases see Gilovich, Valone and Tversky (1985),  
Shleifer(2000), Barberis and Thaler (2004), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). For example, it 
is now well-understood that economic agents tend to give a much larger weight to the last bit 
of information acquired, largely independent from the “true” relevance of it (Shrefin (2005)). 
Moreover, there is evidence that information is valued asymmetrically depending on the state 
of the markets, i.e. in a bull or bear market. 
In volatile environments agents may tend to overreact and in so doing compound the 
complexity of the information and of the market itself. For one, in 2007 when the first 
elements of the financial crisis began to emerge, the mixture of strong and mild signals in an 
increasingly volatile environment made it difficult to understand where markets were heading 
and, in fact, that a period of acute stress was just around the corner. By the same token, once it 
is clear that the markets are in a ‘crisis mode’, understanding whether or not the bottom of the 
crisis has been reached is not a trivial exercise. Contingent indicators together with other 
information can function as the barometer in highly volatile markets and therefore they can be 
a useful tool in assessing the occurrence as well as the severity and the intensity of stress.  25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1214
June 2010
3.2  Computing the FSI 
Chart 6 shows the FSI, i.e. the fitted probability of being in a period of stress at each point in 
time as computed in equation 1 in the chosen sample period. The shaded areas represent the 
stressful periods as described in section 2. As can be seen from the chart, the indicator 
captures well-known periods of financial stress.  
 























































































































































Not surprisingly, the period of August 2007 onwards emerges as the most acute episode of 
financial stress of recent history. Interestingly, the indicator captures also the switch in 
sentiment that the market experienced during the turmoil. For example, at times when major 
central banks temporarily succeeded in calming the markets by injections of liquidity the 
indicator decreases, only to increase again soon afterwards.  
Notably, the indicator also shows an increase in the probability of stress at other, 
much less memorable, points in time. For example, there is a significant increase in 2000 in 
the wake of the dot.com bust. In 2002, financial markets experienced uneasiness originating 26
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from a string of defaults from large companies in telecommunications and was accompanied 
by the Worldcom implosion, the Enron and Vivendi-Universal accounting irregularities.
18  
3.3  FSI compared to the VSTOXX and its noise/signal content 
In the previous section, we showed how the financial stress indicator could capture what, we 
now know, were instances of financial stress rather well and thus be in line with the anecdotal 
evidence. In this section, we instead ask how the indicator is systematically related to more 
general economic conditions. Though the indicator is able to measure and detect times of 
stress, it is useful to see this as measuring rod against other well-known indices of relatively 
high frequency.  
In Chart 7 we show the FSI and the VSTOXX which represents the implied volatility 
of the Euro Stoxx 50 index.
19 While the VSTOXX index is based on equity prices it is 
designed to reflect market’s expectations of near-term volatility and, given its forward-
looking character, to be a more general measure of agents’ perception of market uncertainty. 
The larger the value of the VSTOXX index the larger is market uncertainty. It is important to 
note that financial stress is related to – but is not – identical to market volatility. For example, 
there can be a lot of volatility in the market when new unexpected information arrives in a 
flow but this need not imply that there is stress in the market. On the opposite end, with high 
spreads signifying something amiss, for example that no trade is taking place, the volatility 
might be very low but stress very high. So while the VSTOXX measure is useful, these 
shortcomings imply that its role as an indicator is somewhat limited. Notably, the VSTOXX 




                                                 
18 Among others, for example, the Adelphia, one of the largest US broadcasting companies, defaulted. In Europe 
ABB, a Swedish Swiss engineering firm and Elan a biotech Irish firm were also caught in a string of severe 
accounting irregularities. See also Economist July 15
th  2002. 
19 The VSTOXX Index is based on Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 real time options prices. 27
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Another way to assess the signal/noise content of the FSI is to consider the number of false 
signals, positive or negative. One particularly simple way to do this is to consider a threshold 
level when the markets go from signalling a tranquil period to a period of stress. The critical 
threshold level is calculated so as to strike a balance between “bad” and “good” signals. A 
“bad” signal is a signal not followed by an actual period of stress within a certain horizon and 
a “good” signal is one followed by an actual period of stress within the chosen horizon, 
similar to Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998). We choose as horizon the current one week 
period, which is a useful starting point. Later in the analysis we will change the length of the 
horizon by varying the number of periods included. 
There are four possible cases to consider. A first possible outcome is that a signal is 
followed by a stress period in the current one week period. A second possible outcome is that 
the signal is not followed by a stress period in the current one week period. A third one is that 
the signal has not been issued but a stress period occurs within the chosen window. The final 
possible outcome is that a signal was not issued and stress did not occur. Following 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1999), this information can be summarised in the following 
matrix: 28
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  Stress   No Stress  
Signal  A  B 
No Signal  C  D 
 
where A is the number of periods that a good signal was issued, B is the number of periods 
that a bad signal was issued, C the number of periods that a signal should have been issued (a 
missing signal) and D is the number of periods that a signal was, rightly, not issued. The ratio 
C/(A+C) represents the share of missed periods of stress when stress occurred (A+C). It can 
also be interpreted as the share of type I errors. Similarly, the ratio B/(B+D) represents the 
share of false alarms when stress did not occur (B+D) and therefore it also can be thought as 
the share of type II errors. 
In addition, we impose another criterion on the persistence of the signal that requires 
a good signal to not only pass the threshold within the chosen window (i.e., the current one 
week) but also to stay above it for at least four weeks. In this way we reduce the cases where a 
right signal occurs as just a “blip”. We choose to set the persistency window to the three 
periods before the current period, so that in total for a signal to be “good” the requirement is 
to pass the threshold for four consecutive weeks. In appendix 4, we show the results for 
different window lengths which also include forward periods.  
Following Alessi and Detken (2009), the critical threshold is calculated so as to 
optimise a loss function of an agent, a policy maker for example, that takes into account her 
relative preferences regarding error type I and error type II. The loss function is defined as:  
                          Loss = θ(C/(A+C)) + (1-θ)(B+/(B+D))               (3)   
The loss then can be interpreted as the preference weighted sum of type I and II errors. For 
value of θ lower than 0.5 the agent is increasingly less averse towards missing stress than to a 
false alarm. Correspondingly, for value of θ higher than 0.5, the agent is more averse towards 29
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missing stress than towards receiving a false signal. Table 6 shows the loss function values 
associated with different thresholds when the agent has balanced preferences, i.e. θ=0.5.
20  
















0,1 274 8 216 37 535 0,46
0,2 138 11 213 173 535 0,25
0,3 80 20 204 231 535 0,17
0,4 48 46 178 263 535 0,18
0,5 29 70 154 282 535 0,20
0,6 19 105 119 292 535 0,26
0,7 15 130 94 296 535 0,31
0,8 13 157 67 298 535 0,37
0,9 7 177 47 304 535 0,41
 
The first column shows the threshold values, while column 2 shows the number of weeks the 
FSI was above the threshold within a tranquil period (false signal). Column 3 shows the 
number of weeks the FSI was below the threshold within a stress period (missing signal). 
Column 4 and 5 show the right signal, when the FSI is above the threshold within a stress 
period and when it is below within a tranquil period respectively. The last column shows the 
Loss function value. The minimum value of the Loss function (0.17) is associated with a 
threshold value 0.3. Thus, we choose this as the critical threshold value. 
At this critical threshold (0.3) Table 7 shows that overall the FSI signal is right most 
of the time and correctly picks out five episodes as risk for financial stress. While for some 
events like the dot.com bubble, the signal from the FSI is relatively strong, there are also 
periods in which there is more of a grey area. For example, for the period 2001Q3 the 
indicator signals market stress when stress did not occur (B for the matrix above, i.e. a false 
alarm). However, the evidence of financial markets developments was then particularly hard 
to interpret. In this period, a string of macroeconomic news highlighted an increased risk to 
the outlook for global growth and inflationary pressures with HIPC levels well above the 2% 
target thereby affecting market participants’ perception about the strength of the economy.
21 
                                                 
20 Alessi and Detken (2009) argue that while values of θ’s lower than 0.5 may have been somewhat realistic 
prior to the global financial crisis (2007-2009), it is more likely in the wake of the crisis that preferences 
have shifted towards higher θ. In Appendix 4 we show the values of the loss function for different θ’s at 
different threshold levels.  
21 This period was characterised by a general oil and price volatility. It was also the period of the outbreak of the 
mouth-and-foot disease. See ECB Monthly Bulletin April, May, June 2001 and Appendix 1 for a timeline of 
events.  30
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The period 2004Q4 is an example where the signal from the FSI is weak (missing signal, C 
for the matrix above). But again, the evidence is difficult to interpret. While this period was 
characterised by high levels and heightened volatility of oil prices, the outlook for the euro 
area remained fairly stable.
22 
Thus a few episodes that the FSI does not unequivocally pick out. It is in the nature 
of conflicting signals that no method may answer to all questions. But, as table 8 shows, the 
success ratio for the FSI is quite good and a considerable improvement over raw and noisy 
information from other sources.
23 
Table 7. FSIs’ right and false signals 
Periods of financial stress   Right signal 
A 
False signal  
B or C 
Y2K fear  ☺ 
 
dot.com bubble   ☺ 
 
Corporate accounting scandals  ☺   
2001 Q3    ● 
9/11   ☺   
Heightened uncertainty/inflationary pressures    ● 
Global financial crisis  ☺ 
 
                                                 
22 See Appendix 1 for a timeline of events.  
23 The success ratio is computed here as the number of right signals, respectively for S=0 and S=1, over the total 
number of observations, i.e. 535. This is a somewhat more conservative approach than the ratio computed as 
the number of right(false) signals over the total number of periods when a right(false) signal should have 
been issued. In Appendix 5 we report the success ratio for different threshold levels T computed with both 
approaches. 31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1214
June 2010
 
Table 8. The FSI’s Success Ratio 
T=0.3; θ=0.5 
S=0 S=1
% right signal 43 38
% false signal 15 4
 
 
3.4  Robustness properties 
3.4.1 The FSI out-of-sample performance 
In this section we check the robustness of the FSI in one dimension by looking at its out-of-
sample performance. In order to do this, we estimate the parameters of the FSI up to October 
2006, i.e. well before the financial turmoil began in the summer 2007; consequently, these 
estimates use no information on the turmoil. We then estimate the FSI out-of-sample based on 
the estimated parameters.
24 While it is desirable to compute an evaluation based on period-by-
period rolling regression type framework this is not entirely unproblematic in a Logit 
framework. Instead, we use a simple standard out-of-sample evaluation exercise as well as 
robustness tests in other dimensions of misspecification further below.  
Chart 8 shows the resulting estimates in-sample, the blue continuous line, and out-of-
sample, the dotted red line. The blue line is the FSI as estimated in the previous section and it 
can be thought as the “actual” FSI, while the red dotted line is the (out-of-sample) fitted FSI.  
It can be seen that while the out-of-sample FSI is much less volatile than the “actual” 
FSI, it does pick the surge in stress around August 2007 and it remains at elevated levels 
during the all period of crisis.
25 The performance of the FSI can be also measured by more 
formal tests such as the Root Mean Squared Error test reported in Table 9. The Root Mean 
Squared Error (RMSE), i.e. the root of sum of the squared differences between the out-of-
                                                 
24 We do not perform here a “true” forecast exercise but a conditional out-of-sample forecast based on the 
observed value for the out-of-sample period of the independent variables. 
25 The results are robust to different starting point of the out-of-sample period. 32
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sample estimates (FX) and the in-sample values (X) (forecast errors) divided by the number 
of periods in the out-of-sample period, can be written as:  






                                            (4) 
where 
2
t e are the squared forecast errors in period t, i.e. 
2
t e  = (FX-X)
2
t, h is the number of out-
of-sample periods. While the RMSE is one of the most common statistics used to evaluate 
forecast performance between different models it can be usefully applied also to evaluate the 
performance of the FSI – the lower the value the better the model fit. As can be seen from 
Table 9, its value is rather good at 0.38. Further evidence of good performance is provided by 
Theil’s inequality coefficient decomposition (Theil-U), which is based on RMSE but it scaled 
in such a way that it will always fall between 0 and 1, just like a probability.








t t ￿ ￿ +
= -
2 2                          (5) 
As a rule of thumb, a value of the Theil-U < 0.5 indicates a good model fit, where Theil-U=0, 
i.e. when FXt=Xt for all t, indicates that the model is a perfect fit and conversely if U=1 then 
all other models would be better.  
For ease of understanding, Theil’s inequality coefficient can be usefully decomposed 
in three parts, usually labelled as the bias, the variance and the covariance. A robust model 
typically has a Theil-U < 0.5 but it would also be unbiased and have a small variance while 
leaving most of the difference between in-sample and out-of sample values to be attributable 
to the covariance (see Pyndyck and Rubinfeld (1991) and Brooks (2008)).   
                                                 
26 RMSE for exchange rate models, for example, ranges between 0.6 and 0.8 (see Lam et al. (2008) for a 
summary table of forecasting performance of different models for major exchange rates. For GDP growth 
forecast see Hahn and Skudelny (2008) where RMSE ranges from relatively low ( less than 0.2) to very high 
(more than 0.8) depending on the sectors. 33
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As shown in Table 9, the performance of the model is rather good as the bias and the variance 
proportions are relatively low (0.06 and 0.07 respectively) while the covariance proportion is 
high (0.88). Overall, the FSI performs relatively well.  
Table 9. Evaluation of Fit 
Mean Squared Forecast Error  0.38 
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.24 
Bias Proportion  0.06 
Variance Proportion  0.07 
Covariance Proportion  0.88 
 
3.4.2 The FSI with a mis-specified dependent variable 
One issue with indicators computed in a logit framework is that they may under some 
circumstances be sensitive to mis-specifications of the dependent variable. Therefore, it is 
particularly important to check the robustness of the FSI in this respect. To do this we create 
an ad-hoc dependent variable by introducing noise in our binary dependent variable of 
equation 1. We introduce noise in the dependent variable by scrambling around a certain 
number of observations equal to 10% of the total number of observations (535). We then 
estimate the model as in equation 1 but with the ad-hoc dependent variable. Chart 9 shows the 
FSI as in the previous section and the FSI obtained with the new estimation based on the ad-34
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hoc dependent variable. As Chart 9 shows, the new FSI based on the ad-hoc dependent 
variable closely mirrors the “true” FSI, i.e. the FSI as discussed in the previous sections.  



































































FSI FSI with 10% noise
 
But what would then be the limit of the maximum noise to be introduced? We progressively 
introduced more and more noise in the dependent variable by scrambling around the 
observations in steps of 5% of the total observations. We show the results in Chart 10.  



































































FSI FSI with 5% noise
FSI with 10% noise FSI with 15% noise
FSI with 25% noise
 
As can be seen from the chart, by increasing the noise of the dependent variable the accuracy 
of the FSI to correctly signal the periods of stress diminishes. It takes rather extreme amounts 
of scrambling (40%) in order for signal of the FSI to become poor. Thus, for more plausible 
levels of distortion (say below 10%), the results are robust and informative. 35
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3.4.3 Comparing the FSI to one based only on anecdotal evidence 
In this section, we investigate how much value is added to the FSI constructed primarily from 
anecdotal evidence compared to an FSI that also includes the results of the word-search 
illustrated in section 2. Indeed, as a large part of our analysis is based on the fine tuning of the 
word search, it is desirable to know that the extra computation involved from the word-search 
yields better results.  
In an ideal situation, relative statistical performance of the two different indicators of 
stress (FSI and FSI_anecdotal) could be mapped into a single measure to show the statistical 
gain, for example the classical R
2-measure or values of the likelihood-function. Alas these 
methodologies are not readily applicable. Statistical techniques often rely on gains with 
respect to a specified endogenous variable (the “y” in a typical regression framework), but in 
the paper we are computing two different endogenous variables and we do not know the 
“true” values. Indeed, in some sense, the “true” values of the endogenous variable are not 
interesting in their own right since they are mere constructions and can never be observed. 
The word-search adds value to the FSI if it contributes to detecting stress in a timely way 
without too many false positives. Thus, we compare the FSI with and without the word-search 
in several dimensions to be able to assess the total picture of how much performance is added 
by also including the word-search.   
We proceed by constructing an indicator of stress (FSI_anecdotal) with the same 
methodology as for the FSI but based only on the evidence presented in Table 1. One way to 
compare the FSI and FSI_anecdotal is to assess the accuracy of the signal, i.e. the signal/noise 
ratios from the FSI and FSI_anecdotal. In table 10, we show the number of “bad” and “good” 
signals for FSI_anecdotal using the methodology from section 3 compared to FSI (in 
parenthesis, italics). Just as before, we choose the optimal threshold by minimising the Loss 
function in equation 3. By the Loss function measure, we can see that for all values of the 
threshold the FSI is a less noisy signal than the FSI-anecdotal. Although not strictly 
comparable, the optimum of the FSI based on a threshold of 0.3 has about 20% less noise or, 
alas, 20% more right signals than the FSI based only on anecdotal.
27 
 
                                                 
27 The FSI  has 81% of right signal and 19% false signal; the FSI_anecdotal has 62% right signal and 38% false 
signal. See Appendix 5 for a detailed table.  36
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0,1 292 (274) 6 (8) 232 (216) 5 (37) 535 (535) 0,50 0,46
0,2 265 (138) 22 (11) 216 (213) 32 (173) 535 (535) 0,49 0,25
0,3 156 (80) 47 (20) 191 (204)141 (231) 535 (535) 0,36 0,17
0,4 74 (48) 66 (46) 172 (178)223 (263) 535 (535) 0,26 0,18
0,5 29 (29) 85 (70) 153 (154)268 (282) 535 (535) 0,23 0,20
0,6 14 (19) 135 (105)103 (119)283 (292) 535 (535) 0,31 0,26
0,7 7 (15) 161 (130) 77 (94) 290 (296) 535 (535) 0,35 0,31
0,8 5 (13) 187 (157) 51 (67) 292 (298) 535 (535) 0,40 0,37
0,9 0 (7) 206 (177) 32 (47) 297 (304) 535 (535) 0,43 0,41
Note: FSI values are reported in  italics  
 
One way to summarise these results is to compute the so called Relative Success Ratio: 
signal)   (false) (right    Ratio   Success   tal FSI_anecdo
signal)   (false) (right    Ratio   Success   FSI
signal)   (false) (right    Ratio   Success   Relative =  
In table 11, we show the baseline case of T=0.3 and θ=0.5 while in appendix 5 we show the 
Relative Success Ratio for different threshold levels. The FSI has higher values in the case of 
right signals (164% and 107%) and lower values in the case of false signals (51% and 43%). 
Table 11. Relative Success Ratio  
T=0.3; θ=0.5 
S=0 S=1
% right signal 164 107
% false signal 51 43
Note: the underlying success ratios are computed as in Table 8.    
Finally, we also compute correlations between FSI and FSI_anecdotal (0.97) and S and 
S_anecdotal (0.63); the complete series for the FSI and FSI anectodal are shown below in 





                                                 
28 Chart 4 in Section 2.2 shows S and S_anecdotal. 37
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Overall, although we cannot readily devise a single number to show the enhanced 
performance of the FSI over the FSI_anecdotal, the results from several different indicators 
together indicate the word-search provides substantial value. One possible explanation for this 
result is that the blend of anecdotal evidence combined with a systematic word-search 
contains the best of both worlds.  
 
4.  Predicting future stress - the FSI as leading indicator? 
Ideally, for each stress period one would like to know whether a stress indicator would 
capture the health of financial markets not only in a snapshot but also in the future and thus 
whether the indicator can be used as a leading indicator. Clearly, the property of leading 
indicator is particularly appealing as useful and timely information of future stress would 
enable policy makers as well as market participants to recognise vulnerabilities at an earlier 
stage and to take pre-emptive measures.  
While the FSI is not originally constructed with the primary purpose of being an 
early-warning indicator, having such information might be useful. Thus, investigating to what 
extent the FSI contains properties of an early-warning indicator is interesting in its own right.  38
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While there are several ways to test the leading indicator properties of an index, it is 
not self-evident which one it is the best. One approach is to estimate the model in equation 1 
with lagged independent variables. This means try to predict the exact timing of financial 
stress. But predicting the  exact timing of future stress is very difficult, see for example 
Kaminsky (1998). Following Bussière (2007), Fuertes and Kalotychou (2004), Berg and 
Patillo (1999) we instead use another approach by making predictions on the occurrence of 
stress at any point in a time interval, for example over 24 weeks. More specifically, the 
second approach would extend the prediction window, by transforming the left-hand side 














1 . . ,... 1 1
           (6) 
where St+h is the forward binary variable and k is the length of the prediction window, in our 
example 24 weeks. But it leaves the right-hand side variables at time t, i.e. 
                 FFSIt     =  L( β0 + β1λt + β2δt)                           (7) 
Where, as in equation 1,  λ  is the level index,  δ the rate-of-change,  βi (i= 1, 2) are the 
coefficients and L denotes the Logit probability distribution function. FFSI is our forward 
FSI. 
Chart 12 shows the FFSI when the prediction window is extended to 24 weeks, while 
in appendix 6 we show the FFSI with different forewarning horizon up to one year (54 
weeks).
29 The shaded areas in the chart are the stress periods as identified in the previous 
section 2.2. As the contingent FSI, the FFSI indicator increases during periods of stress while 
declining during tranquil periods. And again, the global financial crisis 2007-2009 appears to 
be the most severe episode of stress in our sample. 
                                                 
29 We choose 24 periods (weeks) as this strikes a fair compromise between the desirable length of the period of 
forewarning for policy makers and the ability of the FFSI to reflect the state of the economy.  39
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periods of stress FFSI_ 24  
In order to measure the performance of the FFSI in terms of predicting future stress, it is 
useful to define a critical level i.e. a threshold, in the same spirit as in section 3.3. There are 
several ways to identify such a threshold, such as minimising a loss function (as we did for 
the FSI), by computing the noise-to-signal ratio, the historical mean level or moving averages.  
To compute the threshold level T, we adopt a different approach for the FFSI.
30 
Following the insights from behavioural finance, we assume that the agent (or forecaster) 
gives a larger weight to the information from closer periods and a lower weight to the 
information further back in time, i.e. T is computed as a weighted average with declining 
exponential weights.
31  
We then assume that the forecaster has information up to time July 2007 and that it 
gives a larger weight, i.e. 0.5, to the information collected in the previous period , i.e. one 
year. The forecaster then weights the information of the preceding years with increasingly 
lower weights, i.e. 0.25 for the information collected between July 2005 and July 2006, 0.12, 
for the information between July 2004 and July 2005, and so on. When computed under these 
assumptions the threshold level T is equal to 0.4.  
                                                 
30 The average of the FFSI is equal to 0.56; the minimum value for the Loss function is equal to 0.6. See 
Appendix 6. 
31 James (2006) reports that such behaviour is by large the most common among market participants when taking 
investment decisions based on future asset prices. See also Barberis and Thaler (2004) for a survey of 
behavioural finance.  40
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The level of the threshold T depends on the initial weight, as shown in Table 11. As 
we do not have a prior about which is the optimal weight, we chose the median (which is also 
the mode) of the threshold levels shown in table 12.  
Table 12. Threshold and initial weights 
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9
Threshold 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5
Initial weights
 
While the FFSI does not cross the threshold and stays persistently above it, i.e. for at least 
four periods, before February 2006, it signals a shift in the level of stress by surging already 
from June 2005. It also displays a relatively large volatility around the threshold level for the 
period between June 2005 and May 2007. While this signal is not strong in absolute terms, it 
is remarkable when one considers that market participants at that time had continued to expect 
buoyant market conditions. It is also noteworthy that, once the turmoil started, it would have 
signalled that stress would be rising at a time when most of forecasters had failed to see the 
impending crisis.  
5.  Conclusion 
By their very nature, rare events or so called “Black-Swans”, pose special problems in 
modelling and for policymakers. While it may be reasonable to ignore extreme events when 
constructing models that are supposed to reflect “normal” times, we know that from time to 
time there will be moments of financial distress. Arguably this is an underdeveloped area of 
applied research and it is important to be able to detect and respond to them in a timely 
manner. Since many existing models did not help in predicting the financial crisis, there are 
good reasons for selecting methods that are more likely to pick up stress in real time than 
those based on conventional methods.  
The FSI achieves this and has been shown to be a timely indicator. Although the 
model is not evaluated in a rolling-regression type framework, we show that the results are 
robust from a simple out-of-sample evaluation exercise as well as robust in various 
dimensions of misspecification. The FSI can be used both to assess the real time stance as 
well as to interact with models in a more formal way. One particularly important question is 
when the markets move beyond the more normal volatility and start to exhibit acute stress. 
The FSI can of course not answer this question unambiguously, but it provides a step in the 41
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1214
June 2010
right direction. Using appropriate threshold levels for the model, it is possible to more 
systematically identify when markets are in an acute period of stress. The FSI is shown to be 
rather robust and to be consistent with both anecdotal evidence and surpass other indices, such 
as VSTOXX, in terms of performance. 
The FSI is not directly derived from theory or from an optimising model. This is both 
a strength and a weakness. The disadvantage of not being based on a model is that it is 
difficult to assess times when the measure may be prone to false signals. On the other hand, 
we have shown that the FSI is good in detecting financial stress and that the false positive 
signals are few. It would clearly be an advantage to have more formal models of rare events 
from mathematical finance. It is not the lack of such models that poses a problem, however, 
but how to implement them. Models with rare events are rather complicated and not entirely 
unproblematic to take to the data or to use in real time. Overall, therefore, the FSI may be a 
good compromise between ease of application and relevance. After all, we know that rare 
events occur from time to time and not being able to measure them at all, except after the fact, 
may not be entirely satisfactory. 
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Appendix 1. Timeline of events from July 1999 to October 2009
32 
July 1999–Dec 1999 
Financial markets are relatively volatile both within and outside the euro area, due in part to 
the perception by financial market participants of operational risks in connection with Y2K. 
Financial market participants concerns start to decline from the second half of December 
1999, after the successful completion of a series of year 2000 tests and an enhanced 
perception of a smooth transition to the year 2000. 
March 2000 
March 2000 was dominated by news about the bursting of the dot.com bubble. In 2000, the 
Nasdaq Composite index declined by close to 20% between end-February and mid-April. 
However, in the United States the positive outlook for future corporate earnings and the 
strength in the pace of economic activity continued (the Standard and Poor’s 500 index 
recorded an increase by 7%). In the euro area, broad indices of euro area stock prices declined 
in March mainly due to the correction in telecommunications and technology related stock 
prices and their strong growth of the previous months. However, both financial and energy 
sectors stock prices increased, partly compensating the decline.  
April 2000-December 2000 
Due to the spill-over effects from the bursting of the dot.com bubble to other sectors of the 
stock market, the volatility of stock prices, both within and outside the euro area, increased 
and remained high with an increased perception of an increasing deterioration of the broad 
economic outlook. Stock markets remained highly volatile for most of the year 2000 (In 
August 2000 volatility declined only to bounce back in September 2000). From the Monthly 
Bulletin in December 2000 (page 25): 
 “Continuing a pattern which has been evident for much of this year, conditions in 
the major stock markets were volatile in the course of November and early 
December. This mainly reflected heightened uncertainty on the part of market 
participants about the prospects for corporate profitability amid indications of a 
slowdown in the pace of global economic activity. ….Looking at the period since 
end-1999, stock prices in the euro area and the United States had declined by 3% 
and 7% respectively by 13 December. In Japan a decline of 19% took place over 
the same period.” 
 
                                                 
32  Sources: ECB Monthly Bulletins, The Economist and Financial Times. A list of detailed and complete 
references is available upon request. 43
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Long term yields declined substantially, being affected by increased uncertainty of market 
participants about future economic activity in US as well as in the euro area (though milder in 
the latter). Towards the end of January, this uncertainty started to ease. Stock markets were 
volatile in December and also started to ease in January while money market volatility was 
high during the all January.  
 
March 2001 
“…an element of uncertainty with regard to the outlook for euro area growth continues to be 
the world economy and its potential impact on euro area developments. However, at this 
juncture, there are no signs that the slowdown in the US economy is having significant and 
lasting spillover effects on the euro area. ….Nevertheless, a close monitoring of global 
developments is warranted.” 
“As regards recent price developments, the annual rate of increase in the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) in January 2001, as published by Eurostat, was 2.4%, 
having been 2.6% in the previous month. Oil prices and the euro exchange rate in January and 
February 2001 were subject to some volatility. Caution is therefore warranted in assessing 
their likely impact on HICP inflation in the short run. Moreover, indirect effects of past oil 
price increases and the depreciation of the euro are still coming through, as witnessed by the 
continued rise in producer price increases for consumer goods. Taken together, these factors 
might prevent consumer price inflation from falling below 2% for some months to come.”  
 
April 2001 
“The deterioration in the external environment implies a somewhat stronger decline in 
economic growth in the euro area this year than was expected some months ago. Available 
forecasts suggest, however, that economic growth in 2001 will be in line with, or above, 
estimates of trend potential growth. Hence the moderation in growth should not be a source of 
pessimism as regards the economic strength of the euro area.”  
In the euro area, the Dow Jones EURO STOXX index fell by close to 9% between 
end-January and 28 February. Against the background of increasing uncertainty about global 
growth prospects during February, market participants appeared to revise their corporate 44
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earnings expectations downwards for euro area firms. This put downward pressure on stock 
prices, particularly in those sectors where revenues depend on the strength of external 
demand. In addition, stock prices in the euro area appeared to be subject to spill-over from 
global stock market developments in February. 
 
May 2001 
“Looking at the second pillar, available evidence indicates that upward risks to price stability 
over the medium term have diminished somewhat.”  
“First, owing to the less favourable external environment, a moderation in real GDP 
growth in the euro area will dampen upward pressure on prices. Recently released indicators 
of economic activity confirm this moderation. This notwithstanding, current forecasts indicate 
that economic growth, supported by domestic demand, will be broadly in line with estimates 
of trend potential growth in 2001.”  
“For some months to come, however, the medium-term inflation trend will be 
overshadowed by temporary developments in unprocessed food prices as a result of health 
concerns related to meat consumption and the consequences of foot-and-mouth disease. 
Moreover, the pass-through of the indirect effects of past rises in oil prices and the past 
depreciation of the euro is likely to continue for some months, as also suggested by recent 
data on producer prices.”  
 
Sept 2001 
Financial market developments were dominated by the terrorist attacks in the United States on 
“9-11”. In the euro area, the continued perception by market participants of a deteriorating 
outlook for economic growth was reinforced by the events in the United States, resulting in a 
substantial decrease of money market interest rates and bond yields (especially short-medium 
maturities) and a surge in volatility. However, towards the end of September and in early 
October, global financial markets stabilised somewhat and implied volatilities declined. 
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Oct 2001-early Nov 2001 
While the stock market recovered in October with a decrease of investors risk aversion, a 
string of macroeconomic data, such as confidence indicators, pointed towards a weak 
economic activity and resulting in substantial bond yields declines.  
Nov 2001  
In November there was a general recovery in financial markets. Led by the stock market 
recovery, bond yields reversed their declining trend and implied volatility in money markets 
decreased.  
 
June 2002-Aug 2002 
In the wake of the Enron-, Worldcom- and Vivaldi-U scandals, markets showed increasing 
stress, in part reflecting increasing concerns about the reliability of financial accounting 
information but also weaker than expected corporate earnings, bond yields as well as stock 
markets in the euro area and in the United States recorded sharp falls which reinforced the 
continued downward trend (see ECB Monthly Bulletin June 2002, page 28; The Economist 
15
th Jul, Aug 1
st, 28
th Nov 2002). 
 
Sept 2002-Oct 2002 
After a short respite in September, geopolitical tensions and their possible impact on oil prices 
and stock market developments begin to materialise which results in a renewed increased 
uncertainty about the outlook for the global economy.  
 
Jan 2003-Mar 2003 
In the euro area amid a rise in uncertainty about the strength of the global recovery, increasing 
investors risk aversion and diminished consumer confidence due to the ongoing geopolitical 
tensions and the threat of further turbulence in the oil markets and lower employment, 
economic activity remained generally subdued.  
The Iraq war was declared (See FT, 19 March 2003).  
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Mar-Apr 2004 
Mixed macroeconomic data releases as well as market participants’ concerns about the impact 
of the appreciation of the euro on the international price competitiveness of euro area 
exporters contributed to the decline of bond yields and to an increase in short-term uncertainty 
which was compounded by the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March. At the same time the 
economic outlook remained stable. 
Jun-Dec 2004 
In this period inflation goes up. Fears of shortages in the supply of oil increase. Oil prices are 




















th 2004). At the same time, the outlook for the euro area remained fairly stable.  
From the ECB Monthly Bulletin editorial September 2004: “The information which 
has become available in recent months indicates that the economic recovery in the euro area 
has maintained its momentum and should remain firm in the coming quarters. Inflation rates 
have been somewhat higher, mainly due to developments in oil prices”. And again few 
months later: “The short-term outlook for inflation remains worrisome. At the current juncture 
oil price developments are having a sizeable impact on consumer prices in the euro area. 
However, there is no significant evidence that stronger underlying domestic inflationary 
pressures are building up” (ECB Monthly Bulletin editorial, December 2004). 
 
April 2005-June 2005 
A string of macroeconomic news, related to a slowdown of growth in major economies and 
developments in oil markets (the Brent crude oil reached the then historical high of USD 57, 
later to be double that amount) highlighted a somewhat increased risk to the outlook for 
global growth. At the same time, market participants’ perception about the continued strength 
of the economy did not change substantially.  
 
July 2005 
7th July was the day of the deadly London bombings, followed just two weeks later (on the 
22nd) by another (fortunately) failed attempt. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in London 
there was a rush for cover. For example, government bond prices across the globe increased 47
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due to flight-to-quality trades.  However, the impact of the terrorist attacks did not have long 
lasting effects on financial markets. (See FT Jul 8th, Jul 9th, Jul 29th 2005).  
 
Oct 2005-Nov 2005 
The outlook for economic activity remains subject to downward risks, relating mainly to oil 
prices, concerns about global imbalances and weak consumer confidence. 48
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Appendix 2: List of words and tables of “word-search” 





 decelerat*  expan*
 adverse* sound
 risk*  robust
 deteriorat*  favourable
 difficult*  recover*
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jan-01 feb-01 mar-01 apr-01 maj-01 jun-01 jul-01 aug-01 sep-01 okt-01 nov-01 dec-01
s l o w * 5 64 59 35 03 5 1 7 24 98 5 1 3 86 64 96 1
uncertain* 44 7 43 25 17 67 7 75 27 43 60 80
weak* 27 14 16 21 7 63 35 33 55 43 47 70
decelerat* 0 0 4 0 0 16 000003
a d v e r s e * 051222 1 445246
r i s k * 3 24 15 63 81 77 92 12 72 63 02 74 9
d e t e r i o r a t * 021805 1 2 1 3 1 24 1 37
d i f f i c u l t * 20462908547 1 0
v i g i l a n t 000022000000
t e n s i o n * 000000000902
i m b a l a n c e * 00620500 1 2449
d o w n t u r n 001005027243
c o n t r a c t * 021000221024
stabilis* 2 7 4 0 9 16 90722 1 1
i m p r o v e * 004627225025
e a s * 000202245027
e x p a n * 72724 1 6743272
sound 0 0 3 0 2 5 228047
r o b u s t 27 2 16 1 77263002
favourable 2 0 18 6 4 28 9 10 14 9 9 11
r e c o v e r * 22 1 060 2 10256 1 6 2 2
u p t u r n 000070000002
t u r m o i l 000200001200
c r i s i s 007002003001
o p t i m i s * 001022043003
p e s s i m i s * 051672003401
average negative 11 9 17 11 6 31 10 18 21 15 16 22
average positive 2 2 8 3 51 2 446 2 58
threshold negative 16
threshold positive 5
jan-02 feb-02 mar-02 apr-02 maj-02 jun-02 jul-02 aug-02 sep-02 okt-02 nov-02 dec-02
s l o w * 3 13 45 53 53 37 71 31 34 03 11 83 6
u n c e r t a i n * 4 25 14 14 28 05 33 84 45 63 58 46 3
w e a k * 3 83 44 32 31 45 02 41 35 11 82 03 6
 d e c e l e r a t * 002043090000
a d v e r s e * 0 2 7 0 61 9 7 41 21 4 6 8
r i s k * 4 21 33 42 32 42 62 03 12 95 52 03 3
 d e t e r i o r a t * 403222001202
 d i f f i c u l t * 81 71 3 5 61 0 4 41 22 01 4 6
 v i g i l a n t 200022200000
t e n s i o n * 0002400234 1 24
imbalance* 4 0 14 2 8 16 7 9 12 10 2 9
 d o w n t u r n 041081705007
c o n t r a c t * 003001004221
stabilis* 10 6 12 9 4 8 2 0 15 6 12 9
i m p r o v e * 61 1 81 6 41 4 4 41 3 8 61 4
e a s * 020201021403
e x p a n * 242243 1 3 1 18 1 0 1 05
sound 0 4 5 2 4 3 2 0 6 6 6 5
r o b u s t 00104 1 0008205
favourable 6 4 9 12 10 6 4 7 9 4 6 6
recover* 17 17 30 28 22 45 20 18 44 12 8 35
 upturn 2 4 10 12 8 11 2 0 3 0 0 1
t u r m o i l 000000001000
c r i s i s 041000003000
optimis* 0 6 9 5 4 2 0 0 1 4 6 2
 p e s s i m i s * 042201200802
average negative 12 12 16 10 14 19 99 16 14 13 15
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jan-03 feb-03 mar-03 apr-03 maj-03 jun-03 jul-03 aug-03 sep-03 okt-03 nov-03 dec-03
s l o w * 1 4 23 72 1 52 72 71 22 4 41 81 8
u n c e r t a i n * 4 0 1 1 58 35 8 1 3 65 26 73 43 73 12 62 6
w e a k * 2 83 37 43 33 14 83 55 43 72 72 62 8
decelerat* 0 0 7 0 7 3 0 0 1 0 0 1
a d v e r s e * 64 1 7806445 1 045
risk* 22 26 20 15 166 40 31 26 29 22 30 33
d e t e r i o r a t * 090204240024
difficult* 8 4 14 8 24 5 12 4 3 6 2 7
v i g i l a n t 000000000000
tension* 20 20 30 17 16 6 0 0 0 4 0 4
imbalance* 6 4 10 0 3 22 6 4 13 6 5 6
d o w n t u r n 003403 1 021000
c o n t r a c t * 000031220242
 stabilis* 6 4 9 10 14 23 12 10 22 14 14 11
i m p r o v e * 1 6 7 4 4 51 42 21 02 01 22 52 0
e a s * 200021220092
expan* 2 4 4 4 10 5 2 4 6 8 4 7
s o u n d 22243 1 1005028
r o b u s t 20523602 1 2248
f a v o u r a b l e 2982778 1 03 1 2 1 6 1 2
r e c o v e r * 82 02 0 4 92 23 11 82 72 01 63 1
u p t u r n 000005 1 226822
t u r m o i l 000000200000
c r i s i s 000023201026
o p t i m i s * 222001688455
p e s s i m i s * 222253002000
average negative 11 17 23 13 31 17 15 11 12 9 9 11
average positive 4 5 5 3 5 91 0 71 1 8 91 1
threshold negative 15
threshold positive 7
jan-04 feb-04 mar-04 apr-04 maj-04 jun-04 jul-04 aug-04 sep-04 okt-04 nov-04 dec-04
s l o w * 92 73 2 81 61 82 01 63 04 62 43 3
u n c e r t a i n * 5 55 24 69 26 94 25 25 84 75 75 76 9
w e a k * 1 71 53 12 41 01 41 82 02 12 62 53 3
decelerat* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 0 6
a d v e r s e * 607424002049
r i s k * 3 84 08 14 54 93 74 25 85 14 86 59 4
d e t e r i o r a t * 909001000001
d i f f i c u l t * 22 1 0020255406
v i g i l a n t 000001401000
t e n s i o n * 003000002040
imbalance* 4 6 24 8 8 16 4 4 12 0 4 18
d o w n t u r n 027001204000
c o n t r a c t * 020423601220
stabilis* 13 6 15 4 4 13 10 4 17 4 10 9
i m p r o v e * 2 83 83 71 83 31 6 41 62 0 91 81 8
e a s * 0270010 3 142 2 50
e x p a n * 1 1 61 31 01 41 11 41 11 41 11 61 2
sound 4 2 12 0 2 6 1242425
r o b u s t 41 31 82 22 42 82 62 03 02 81 42 6
favourable 19 13 21 20 16 19 8 15 16 20 14 21
recover* 43 33 47 55 39 48 40 35 26 26 14 15
u p t u r n 444660290202
t u r m o i l 000000000020
c r i s i s 000000000020
o p t i m i s * 66 1 6644204020
p e s s i m i s * 000000200000
average negative 12 12 21 15 13 11 13 13 16 15 16 22
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jan-05 feb-05 mar-05 apr-05 maj-05 jun-05 jul-05 aug-05 sep-05 okt-05 nov-05 dec-05
s l o w * 6 02 64 45 83 94 15 91 92 02 13 2 6
u n c e r t a i n * 6 89 12 41 32 82 63 62 63 04 05 44 3
w e a k * 4 22 82 73 12 73 24 42 93 33 74 82 2
 d e c e l e r a t * 240695002002
a d v e r s e * 646007235253
r i s k * 6 68 66 77 79 15 26 67 19 06 17 57 1
 d e t e r i o r a t * 022231202050
 difficult* 2 0 4 12 0 4 3 0 1 6 3 3
 v i g i l a n t 000021200001
t e n s i o n * 000002000002
imbalance* 0 4 18 6 8 12 7 6 10 6 5 9
 d o w n t u r n 024222204020
c o n t r a c t * 002420200020
s t a b i l i s * 24645 1 1 1 020525
improve* 17 23 16 19 11 12 22 26 27 18 25 22
e a s * 63 0 4 23 0 4 53 7 8 22 8 3
e x p a n * 6 7 32 1 8 71 2 51 21 0 6 5
sound 0 2 6 4 5 13 0 2 2 2 0 9
r o b u s t 2 32 12 44 43 03 11 93 43 23 23 82 9
favourable 23 19 23 15 16 20 17 15 30 16 23 34
r e c o v e r * 657005 1 0675 6 27
 u p t u r n 202002002050
t u r m o i l 001000000000
crisis 0 0 1 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
optimis* 0 2 8 0 0 2 5 2 4 0 3 0
 p e s s i m i s * 000000000020
average negative 20 20 17 19 17 15 19 13 16 15 19 14
average positive 8 11 10 11 10 11 10 13 13 9 19 11
threshold negative 17
threshold positive 11
jan-06 feb-06 mar-06 apr-06 maj-06 jun-06 jul-06 aug-06 sep-06 okt-06 nov-06 dec-06
slow* 6 33 27 37 23 16 14 17 43 56 40 38
u n c e r t a i n * 3 73 55 12 32 64 61 73 23 42 12 73 7
w e a k * 2 51 11 82 71 81 31 61 21 71 72 41 8
decelerat* 4 4 4 0 0 2 0 2 8 6 0 0
a d v e r s e * 201200303411
r i s k * 5 97 59 07 2 1 0 0 1 2 49 7 1 0 38 49 2 1 0 48 9
d e t e r i o r a t * 000222004231
d i f f i c u l t * 644500303201
v i g i l a n t 000000000000
t e n s i o n * 0 1 830000 3 15460
imbalance* 8 11 17 10 8 11 9 14 8 10 25 16
d o w n t u r n 020321207402
c o n t r a c t * 821000200000
 stabilis* 2 2 1 0 2 7 0 2 3 4 7 1
i m p r o v e * 2 42 02 11 02 01 81 61 42 11 71 62 3
e a s * 2 3 13 1 2 4 143 2 458 2 85
e x p a n * 41 51 61 21 31 01 7 71 42 51 52 0
s o u n d 42520 1 023944 1 3
robust 47 40 27 28 30 28 45 25 36 46 48 57
favourable 16 29 47 28 34 27 31 20 37 19 21 31
recover* 20 11 10 5 18 17 2 3 14 2 4 2
u p t u r n 021303205001
t u r m o i l 000000000011
c r i s i s 000000000000
o p t i m i s * 026030000011
p e s s i m i s * 000000223000
average negative 13 16 18 15 15 18 14 18 18 18 19 17
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jan-08 feb-08 mar-08 apr-08 maj-08 jun-08 jul-08 aug-08 sep-08 okt-08 nov-08 dec-08
s l o w * 4 36 25 46 66 67 03 07 17 56 64 19 5
u n c e r t a i n * 2 13 42 73 73 72 92 72 03 05 34 26 7
w e a k * 2 62 54 33 83 83 24 26 15 38 35 79 1
decelerat* 3 0 5 2 2 7 0 5 15 6 1 11
adverse* 1 1 7 2 2 2 13 10 10 14 9 10
r i s k * 1 0 0 1 3 48 78 68 6 1 1 48 8 1 1 08 6 1 1 1 1 2 35 4
d e t e r i o r a t * 01 0 6 0 0 5 41 81 01 71 92 3
d i f f i c u l t * 000000000000
v i g i l a n t 000000000000
tension* 38 14 27 25 25 27 57 65 49 63 49 50
i m b a l a n c e * 9 1 3 1 2997883694
d o w n t u r n 13122331221 1 2
c o n t r a c t * 144223197669
stabilis* 9 8 17 3 3 29 10 4 13 8 3 14
i m p r o v e * 71766 1 1549232
e a s * 1 1 83227435998
expan* 16 11 14 28 28 9 14 11 15 17 6 14
sound 10 7 12 11 11 16 964217
robust 31 21 14 31 31 17 18 13 13 19 6 11
f a v o u r a b l e 1 57 2 0 1 5 1 5 2 1 1 099313
r e c o v e r * 11300331553 1 0
u p t u r n 000001100001
t u r m o i l 3 55 54 43 53 53 01 82 8 92 05 34 3
c r i s i s 0320000105 1 9 1 5
o p t i m i s * 001551030200
p e s s i m i s * 030000001001
a v e r a g e n e g a t i v e 2 12 82 42 32 32 52 231 27 35 33 37
average positive 9 8 9 10 10 11 8 57737
threshold negative 28
threshold positive 8
jan-09 feb-09 mar-09 apr-09 maj-09 jun-09 jul-09 aug-09 sep-09 okt-09 nov-09 dec-09
s l o w * 3 53 06 92 36 34 82 23 34 62 9
u n c e r t a i n * 3 12 54 63 11 94 45 4 1 2 47 04 5
w e a k * 6 75 47 46 56 16 34 73 83 43 2
 decelerat* 2 3 16 13 26 11 14 18 15 8
a d v e r s e * 3 1 1 1 28 1 1 1 29744
r i s k * 5 14 28 77 46 44 44 26 95 23 6
 deteriorat* 9 10 28 17 7 10 3 4 4 15
 d i f f i c u l t * 0000000000
 v i g i l a n t 0000000000
tension* 41 19 21 14 10 8 5 7 9 0
i m b a l a n c e * 4765237244
 d o w n t u r n 61 12 21 81 82 82 0 41 81 3
c o n t r a c t * 1 11 41 92 33 53 33 43 33 72 0
s t a b i l i s * 3 6 52 1 71 43 61 21 14 5
improve* 0 3 4 3 15 11 7 12 21 11
e a s * 4363 1 0 1 27655
expan* 8 5 12 6 4 8 7 11 9 12
sound 1 0 12 4 1 4 3 1 6 3
r o b u s t 5654435575
favourable 1 2 3 0 1 4 0 2 6 4
recover* 1 6 8 4 4 5 11 12 16 21
 u p t u r n 0000001131
t u r m o i l 2 02 52 93 11 42 62 81 91 2 4
crisis 4 3 13 27 5 13 24 8 20 7
optimis* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 p e s s i m i s * 0010011214
average negative 24 21 37 29 28 28 26 31 27 18
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jan-99 feb-99 mar-99 apr-99 maj-99 jun-99 jul-99 aug-99 sep-99 okt-99 nov-99 dec-99
slow* 55 35 80 23 67 39
uncertain* 16 14 10 12 23 85
weak* 2 0 62 41 71 31 3
decelerat* 6480 1 01
adverse* 006201








stabilis* 388 1 204
improve* 91 42 21 33 12 5
eas* 000000
expan* 61 1 488 1 5
sound 010000
robust 808287
favourable 87885 1 3
recover* 2 2 52 81 32 61 6




pessimis* 20 1 4433
average negative 97 16 6 12 15
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 Appendix 3: Logit model estimation 
The dependent variable St in equation 1 is a binary variable where 0=no stress and 1=stress. 
Following the usual notation in a logit model, it is assumed that St is an indirect observation of 
the continuous latent variable St*, where  
               St* = α+ β’Xt + εt  
t= 1,…T and Xt is the set of explanatory variables. Under the logistic distribution for εt, the 






























In the text the set of variables X consist of the level and the change indicators. The estimation 
results are presented in the following table, where we also show the results for different 
lengths of the period over which we compute the change, i.e. over 8, 12 and 18 weeks:  
Table A1. Logit model estimation 
FSI FSI FSI
Level  4,52 4,30 4,21
Change 8 periods 0,05
Change 12 periods 0,09
Change 18 periods 0,07
McFadden R-squared 0,34 0,33 0,30
Note: figures in bold are significant at least at 5% significance level  
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Appendix 4. Loss function values
Table A2. Loss function values for different θ’s.
T theta=0.3 theta=0.4 theta=0.5 theta=0.6 theta=0.7 theta=0.8
0,1 0,63 0,54 0,46 0,37 0,29 0,20
0,2 0,33 0,29 0,25 0,21 0,17 0,13
0,3 0,21 0,19 0,17 0,16 0,14 0,12
0,4 0,17 0,17 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,20
0,5 0,16 0,18 0,20 0,22 0,25 0,27
0,6 0,18 0,22 0,26 0,31 0,35 0,39
0,7 0,21 0,26 0,31 0,37 0,42 0,47
0,8 0,24 0,31 0,37 0,44 0,50 0,57
0,9 0,25 0,33 0,41 0,48 0,56 0,64
Table A3. Loss function values for different T’s (θ=0.5)
















0,1 278 8 216 37 539 0,46
0,2 142 11 213 173 539 0,25
0,3 84 20 204 231 539 0,18
0,4 52 46 178 263 539 0,19
0,5 33 70 154 282 539 0,21
0,6 22 105 119 293 539 0,27
0,7 18 130 94 297 539 0,32
0,8 15 157 67 300 539 0,37
0,9 8 177 47 307 539 0,4156
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Table A4. Loss function values for different T’s
















0,1 274 8 216 37 535 0,46
0,2 138 11 213 173 535 0,25
0,3 80 20 204 231 535 0,17
0,4 48 46 178 263 535 0,18
0,5 29 70 154 282 535 0,20
0,6 19 105 119 292 535 0,26
0,7 15 130 94 296 535 0,31
0,8 13 157 67 298 535 0,37
0,9 7 177 47 304 535 0,41
Table A5. Loss function values for different T’s (θ=0.5)
















0,1 274 8 216 37 535 0,46
0,2 138 11 213 173 535 0,25
0,3 81 20 204 230 535 0,17
0,4 50 46 178 261 535 0,18
0,5 33 70 154 278 535 0,21
0,6 22 105 119 289 535 0,27
0,7 18 130 94 293 535 0,32
0,8 15 157 67 296 535 0,37
0,9 8 177 47 303 535 0,4157
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Appendix 5. Success Ratio
Table A6. FSI Success Ratio for different T’s (θ=0.5)
T S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
0,1 7% 40% 51% 1%
0,2 32% 40% 26% 2%
0,3 43% 38% 15% 4%
0,4 49% 33% 9% 9%
0,5 53% 29% 5% 13%
0,6 55% 22% 4% 20%
0,7 55% 18% 3% 24%
0,8 56% 13% 2% 29%
0,9 57% 9% 1% 33%
Note: the success ratio is computed here as in Table 8.
right signal false signal
Table A7. FSI’s Success Ratio for different T’s (θ=0.5)
T S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
0,1 12% 96% 88% 4%
0,2 56% 95% 44% 5%
0,3 74% 91% 26% 9%
0,4 85% 79% 15% 21%
0,5 91% 69% 9% 31%
0,6 94% 53% 6% 47%
0,7 95% 42% 5% 58%
0,8 96% 30% 4% 70%
0,9 98% 21% 2% 79%
Note: the success ratio is computed as the number of right (false)
signals over the total number of periods in which a right (false)
signal should have been issued.
right signal false signal58
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Table A8. FSI_anecdotal’s Success Ratio for different T’s (θ=0.5)
T S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
0,1 1% 43% 55% 1%
0,2 6% 40% 50% 4%
0,3 26% 36% 29% 9%
0,4 42% 32% 14% 12%
0,5 50% 29% 5% 16%
0,6 53% 19% 3% 25%
0,7 54% 14% 1% 30%
0,8 55% 10% 1% 35%
0,9 56% 6% 0% 39%
Note: the success ratio is computed here as in Table 8.
right signal false signal
Table A9. FSI_anecdotal’s Success Ratio for different T’s (θ=0.5)
T S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
0,1 2% 107% 98% 3%
0,2 10% 100% 89% 9%
0,3 44% 88% 53% 20%
0,4 69% 80% 25% 28%
0,5 83% 71% 10% 36%
0,6 88% 48% 5% 57%
0,7 90% 36% 2% 68%
0,8 90% 24% 2% 79%
0,9 92% 15% 0% 87%
Note: the success ratio is computed as the number of right
(false) signals over the total number of periods in which a
right(false) signal should have beenissued.
right signal false signal59
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Table A10. Relative Success Ratio for different T’s (θ=0.5)
right signal false signal
T S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
0,1 740% 93% 94% 133%
0,2 541% 99% 52% 50%
0,3 164% 107% 51% 43%
0,4 118% 103% 65% 70%
0,5 105% 101% 100% 82%
0,6 103% 116% 136% 78%
0,7 102% 122% 214% 81%
0,8 102% 131% 260% 84%
0,9 102% 147% ∞ 86%
Note: the success ratio is computed here as in Table 8.60
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Appendix 6. Forward FSI (FFSI)




























































periods of stress FFSI_6 FFSI_12 FFSI_ 24 FFSI_54









Level 6,48 6,43 7,61 5,49
Change 0,14 0,08 -0,02 0,01
McFadden R-squared 0,42 0,38 0,37 0,24
Note: figures in bold are significant at least at 5% significance level61
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Table A12. FFSI’s Loss function values for different T’s (θ=0.5)
















0,1 176 2 234 0 412 0,50
0,2 148 25 211 28 412 0,47
0,3 124 36 200 52 412 0,43
0,4 82 48 188 94 412 0,33
0,5 32 49 187 144 412 0,19
0,6 9 72 164 167 412 0,18
0,7 6 87 149 170 412 0,20
0,8 5 94 142 171 412 0,21
0,9 1 179 57 175 412 0,38
Table A13. FFSI’s Loss function values for different θ’s
window = 3 backward +current period
T theta=0.3 theta=0.4 theta=0.5 theta=0.6 theta=0.7 theta=0.8
0,1 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,41 0,31 0,21
0,2 0,62 0,55 0,47 0,40 0,33 0,25
0,3 0,54 0,48 0,43 0,37 0,32 0,26
0,4 0,39 0,36 0,33 0,31 0,28 0,26
0,5 0,19 0,19 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,20
0,6 0,13 0,15 0,18 0,20 0,23 0,25
0,7 0,13 0,17 0,20 0,23 0,27 0,30
0,8 0,14 0,18 0,21 0,25 0,29 0,32
0,9 0,23 0,31 0,38 0,46 0,53 0,6162
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